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Competitiveness Between Argentina and Brazil 
1. Introduction
In 2016, the economic recession and following political turmoil in Argentina, Brazil, and 
Venezuela cast doubts on the future of Mercosur, whose performance had been under debate 
for a long time. As a free trade area and a customs union, Mercosur achieved early success in 
promoting intra-regional trade. In its early days, growth in intra-regional trade was strong and 
rose from US$ 5.2 billion in 1991 to US$ 20.3 billion in 1997, with the share of intra-regional 
trade in total trade rising from 8.9% in 1990 to a peak of 24.5% in 1997. Nonetheless, such 
beneficial commercial ties between Mercosur states, according to Yeats (1997), were 
inefficient because of a trade diversion effect. The growth of trade flows in Mercosur in the 
1990s focused on products in which member countries did not display a comparative advantage. 
Moreover, the apparent reason fueling this growth was the substantial preference margins 
offered to inefficient local producers. For some (Bekerman & Rikap, 2010), Yeats’ argument 
didn’t consider the situation prior to the formation of Mercosur, when both Brazil and 
Argentina pursued import substitution industrialization, discouraging imports of manufactured 
products. Thus, the construction of Mercosur yielded a substantial degree of trade creation, 
while diverting a minor amount of trade from nonmembers. A more head-on argument claims 
that the liberal trade based on static comparative advantages determined by given factor 
endowments might cause asymmetric potential growth effects, a danger that could lock 
resource abundant countries in the sub-industrialized status. Under such circumstances, the 
integration process involving developing countries that are most mutually “similar” could 
provide tools to develop scale economies and learning processes that would make it possible 
to generate dynamic comparative advantages both inside and outside the region (Rodrik & 
Wolfsan, 1995; Amsden, 1997). Thus, a free trade area arrangement between developing 
countries, such as Mercosur, with preferential policies, secures access to new, mutually similar 
markets, which could serve as a platform for subsequently gaining access to markets outside 
the bloc. 
Theoretical debates aside, the truth is that the integration process of Mercosur measured by 
intra-regional trade intensity was halted in the new century. The levels of both openness and 
interdependence fell during the crises of 1999-2002. However, economic growth and openness 
have picked up since that time. Consequently, this time it was the rest of the world that 
underpinned trade growth. The ratio between extra-regional trade to intra-regional trade grew 
from 3.6 in 1998 to 5.5 in 2008, and further to 6.4 in 2014 - the highest mark since the bloc's 
foundation. More importantly, smaller countries in the block still lack the highly expected 
dynamic comparative advantage in industrial products, and their trading structure both inside 
and outside the bloc has hardly changed. Preferential access granted under Mercosur largely 
benefited Brazil, serving its industrialization objectives. More than a decade after the argument 
presented by Yeats, Moncarz et al. (2010) still found that the bulk of Brazilian exports to 
Mercosur partners consisted of sophisticated industrialized products where Brazil did not 
possess a clear comparative advantage in the global market. 
During this process, the international environment changed with the emergence of China as a 
manufacturing powerhouse and the largest trading nation in the world. In less than 15 years, 
between 2001 and 2014, China’s exports grew from US$ 20.3 billion to US$ 2.2 trillion, 
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successively surpassing Japan, Germany, and the United States. In the meantime, China’s 
imports increased from US$ 213.7 billion to US$ 1.2 trillion, only lagging behind the United 
States. From Mercosur’s perspective, China was the source of 16.3% of its total imports in 
2014, and the destination of 14.2% of its exports, while the middle kingdom only accounted 
for 3.2% and 2.8% respectively in 2001. Nowadays, China is the largest trading partner of 
Brazil and the second largest of Argentina, Uruguay, and Paraguay. China’s trade expansion 
in Latin America was initially depicted as an opportunity for most of Latin American countries, 
as their export structures were largely complementary (Lall, 2005; Blázquez-Lidoy et al., 2007; 
Qureshi & Wan, 2008; Lederman, 2009) and China’s demand improved the trade terms of 
commodity exporting countries. Nonetheless, this optimistic tone faded while concerns grew 
given China’s manufacturing competitiveness, especially in economies belonging to Mercosur, 
whose design aims to generate sustainable long-term growth potential by increasing 
industrialization. While recognizing the positive effects of commodity exports to China, the 
pessimists highlighted how China’s appetite for raw materials might distort the incentive 
structure and lure the resources away from the manufacturing sector, causing the 
“primarization” and “deindustrialization” or manufacturing “hollowing out” in the case of 
Brazil (Jenkins & Barbosa, 2012; Jenkins, 2014;) and “sojización”1 in the case of Argentina 
(López et al., 2010). In addition, this stream of literature also warned of the incapability of 
domestic producers to compete with China’s manufacturing items in their national markets 
(Moreira, 2007; Jenkins et al., 2008; Gallagher & Porzecansky, 2010).  
This concern became even more relevant after the global financial crisis, when industrial and 
trade policies implemented in Mercosur, such as Argentina and Brazil, attempted to strengthen 
the import substitution strategy to protect their domestic markets and to localize the productive 
chains. This paper tends to update our understanding about China’s impact on Mercosur trade 
integration and manufacturing competitiveness during the post-crisis period, using Argentina 
and Brazil as examples. Based on disaggregated trade statistics between 2009 and 2014, the 
research is designed to go beyond country borders and examine the dynamic trilateral trade 
relationship, taking into account the crisis effect on industrial and trade policy formulation. 
Through a constant market share analysis, this paper first finds the persistence of China’s 
asymmetric trade pattern with Argentina and Brazil, but a decline in China’s weight in 
explaining the decreasing bilateral trade intensity between Argentina and Brazil; second, it 
explores the divergent export performance between Argentina and Brazil to China, mainly 
attributed to the competitiveness shift in the soybean sector; and finally, it researches the 
enlargement of a competitiveness gap between Mercosur countries and China in the upstream 
of the manufacturing supply chain. 
The following text will be organized in the subsequent order: section two presents the main 
characteristics of China’s trade pattern with Argentina and Brazil, and discusses both short-
term and long-term crisis effects on industrial and trade policies adopted in respective countries; 
section three introduces the method employed; section four reports and analyzes the 
competition between Argentina and Brazil in China, as well as the resulting consequence on 
their bilateral trade structure; section five reports and analyzes China’s presence in 
manufactured goods imported by Argentina and Brazil, and evaluates China’s direct impacts 
on their bilateral manufacturing trade flows; section six concludes with a general reflection on 
the present and future situation of Mercosur. 
1 “Sojización” is the replacement of traditional crops in a region with soy. One of the factors that influence this 
process is the increase in the price of soybeans. 
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2. Mercosur Trade Integration and Industrialization Under China’s Rise 
From its inception, Mercosur was conceived as an attractive project of regional integration. 
The strong political will between re-democratized governments in Brazil and Argentina, 
culminating in the Integration and Economic Cooperation Program (PICE) in 1986, paved way 
for the signing of the Treaty of Asuncion in 1991, which later resulted in the establishment of 
a common market composed of Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay in 1994. The 
integration model, through preferential tariff concessions between member countries and the 
construction of an imperfect customs union, was expected to amplify market size, achieve scale 
economies, stimulate productive restructuring, and increase the competitiveness of member 
countries. Fundamental to the initial success was the macroeconomic coordination, especially 
the alignment of the exchange rates between Brazil and Argentina. The period of appreciation 
of the exchange rate and the search for open regionalism from 1995 to 1999 led to an increase 
in intra-group trade flows. However, heavily affected by the Asian crisis in 1998, Brazil and 
Argentina successively entered into exchange crisis between 1999 and 2002, which gave rise 
to unilateral protectionist measures, and more importantly, weakened mutual trust on the 
commitment formerly given to the joint action plan. 
Newly elected governments after the exchange crisis, both in Argentina and Brazil, somehow 
relaunched their regional integration plans. Once the understanding was regained, the initial 
commitment of these governments was retaken and deepening integration was reconsidered. 
Nevertheless, under left-wing political leadership on both sides, the integration process has 
been more contextualized towards more inward-looking domestic priorities, such as job 
creation and protecting national industries. The practice of unilateral protectionist measures, 
especially tariff and non-tariff restrictions and non-automatic import licenses, such as 
Declaraciones Juradas Anticipadas de Importaciones (DJAI)2  imposed by the Argentine 
government, was maintained. Mercosur can thus be described as an “incomplete free trade area” 
and an “imperfect customs union”. 
Few advance in institution building impeded the deepening of regional integration in the 21st 
century. Compared with other trade blocs, such as the European Union, NAFTA, and 
ASEAN+3, Mercosur lagged far behind in terms of intra-group trade. Between 2002 and 2014, 
intra-group trade only accounted for 13% of total Mercosur trade. Moreover, the trade with the 
rest of South and Central American countries grew so slowly that its share reduced from 41% 
to 26%. It is clear that Mercosur had deepened its trade relations with countries located outside 
Latin America in the 2000s, among which China played a unique role both as an exporter and 
importer. 
2.1. Characteristics of China’s Trade with Mercosur 
On the export side, Mercosur’s exports to China grew from US$ 3.8 billion in 2002 to US$ 56.6 
billion in 2014, making China the second largest export market behind the United States. On 
the import side, Mercosur’s total imports from China increased by 24 times in value, achieving 
US$ 59.2 billion in 2014, and surpassed EU15 as the largest source of manufacturing imports 
                                                 
2 As one of the most important political instruments, the Declaraciones Juradas Anticipadas de Importación 
(DJAI) was put in place in January 2012. The application of this regulation covers the entire universe of goods 
imported into the country in definitive form for consumption. Despite the official declaration to simplify the 
operation of foreign trade and to establish a single window for the procedures of entry or exit of Argentinian 
goods, the implementation of this authorization procedure, in particular due to the “Observations” made by the 
Secretary of Internal Commerce (so-called until December 2013, then the Ministry of Commerce) resulted in 
increases in the time required to import products, affecting those coming from the MERCOSUR member states 
and other sources (BID, 2014).  
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of Mercosur. Undoubtedly, the biggest story of Mercosur’s extra-regional trade development 
in the 2000s was the rise of China, which has moved from the periphery to the core of 
Mercosur’s trade map. However, China is not simply just another trade partner as the United 
States and the European Union have been. Mercosur’s extra-regional trade pattern has long 
been asymmetric by exporting commodities in exchange for manufactured goods. However, 
its trade relation with China goes even further in this direction. As shown in Table 1, according 
to the estimation of Hiratuka (2016), the intra-industrial trade index between China and 
Mercosur was a mere 1.7 in 2014, which was incredibly lower than that of the U.S. (21.8) and 
the EU (16.6). This phenomenon could be explained by the high concentration of few products 
between Mercosur and China. 78.8% of the exports from Mercosur to China in 2014 were 
attributed to three types of commodities at the HS 2-digit level: HS12 Oil seeds and oleaginous 
fruits, HS26 Mineral ores, slag, and ashes, and HS 27 Mineral fuels and oils, while 55.3% of 
its imports from China were composed of three lines of manufactured goods: HS 85 Electrical 
machinery and equipment and parts thereof, HS 84 Nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery, and 
mechanical appliances, and HS 29 Organic chemicals. The degrees of concentration both on 
the export and import side were higher than that with the United States and the European Union.  
Table 1: Comparison of Trade Patterns Between Mercosur and Its Main Partners in 2014 
 Intra-
industrial 
trade index* 
Degree of 
concentration** 
Trade balance of medium and 
high technology intensive 
manufactured goods (US$ million) 
  CX3 CM3 2001 2014 
Mercosur 37 48.2% 45.7% 4.7 -11.1 
US 21.8 38.4% 47.6% -3 441.1 -10 120.3 
EU 16.6 36.2% 40.3% -8 643.4 -24 370.8 
China 1.7 78.8% 55.3% -961.9 -29 692.4 
(Source: Hiratuka 2016)  
*Intra-industrial trade index refers to Grubel-Lloyd index at HS 4-digit level. For a product i, 
𝐺𝐿𝑖𝑗 = [(𝑋𝑖𝑗
𝑘 +𝑀𝑖𝑗
𝑘 ) − |𝑋𝑖𝑗
𝑘 −𝑀𝑖𝑗
𝑘 |] ∗ 100 (𝑋𝑖𝑗
𝑘 +𝑀𝑖𝑗
𝑘 )⁄ , where 𝑋𝑖𝑗
𝑘  is the export of product i 
from country j to country k, and 𝑀𝑖𝑗
𝑘  is the import of product i from country k to country j. For 
the calculation of the GL index of each country with Mercosur, the index of each member 
country is weighted with trade shares of product i, and the bilateral trade weights are used to 
add the indices of each member country. 
** The indicator CX3 measures the relative weight of the first three chapters exported by a 
country (or region) as part of its total exports. Alternatively, the indicator CM3 will show the 
dependency level of the country (region) in relation to its first three imported products. 
 
Under this context, two opposite opinions have been forged considering China’s impact on 
Mercosur trade integration and industrialization. On one hand, China’s quest for commodities, 
including fuels, as well as agricultural and mineral primary goods not only quantitatively 
boosted the exports of Mercosur’s traditional competitive goods in the world market, but also 
steeply drove trade terms in favor of Mercosur exporters. Therefore, a favorable export record 
with China represented a positive source of growth for Latin America (Ortiz et al., 2015; 
Vianna, 2016), and allowed Mercosur member countries to maintain a relatively high growth 
rate, and gain more autonomy in deciding their economic policies for national industry 
recovery (Hiratuka, 2016). China thus could be depicted as part of the favorable external 
condition that, at least before the global financial crisis, supported manufacturing resurgences 
in Argentina and Brazil. On the other hand, China broke Mercosur’s imperfect shield against 
external competition. China’s exports, led by medium and high technology intensive goods, 
has been translated into Mercosur’s impressive increase of deficits against China in that 
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category. From 2001 to 2014, the deficit was augmented by 31 times in value, reaching 29.7 
US$ billion which made China the largest source of deficits in sophisticated industrial goods. 
Given the importance of the Mercosur market for manufacturing trade between member 
countries3, China’s growing manufacturing exports to Mercosur was partly achieved at the cost 
of Mercosur member countries in their regional markets 4 . In this sense, China could be 
considered an interrupting factor that endangers the regional integration of Mercosur and its 
productive structure upgrading.  
However, it is too simple to follow a dichotomous perspective considering China’s overall 
impact on Mercosur trade integration and competitiveness as a tradeoff between export gains 
and import losses. Lederman et al. (2009), consistent with the neo-liberal approach, stressed 
the possibility of importing cheaper technology intensive products to improve economic 
efficiency. On the contrary, Jenkins et al. (2008), more akin to neo-developmentalism point of 
view, emphasized the difficulty to maintain a competitive industrial sector not only because of 
the direct competition with China, but also the “primarization” or “deindustrialization” induced 
by favorable relative prices of primary and natural resource intensive goods. Due to the 
complex nature of trade effect, China’s influence on Mercosur integration and industrialization 
is dynamic and is contingent upon trade structure, trade and industrial policies, as well as the 
state capacity of involved countries, which would evolve over time in response to new 
challenges imposed by the external environment and unexpected events, such as the 2008 
global financial crisis. 
2.2. Crisis Effect 
The 2008 global financial crisis altered the external condition and exerted both short-term and 
long-term effects on industrial and trade policies in China, and two major Mercosur economies 
- Argentina and Brazil. For China, a collapse in trade flows was observed in late 2008. In 
general, China’s merchandise exports and imports declined by 16.0% and 11.1%, respectively, 
between 2008 and 2009. For Argentina and Brazil, the impact was greater on intra-bloc 
commerce. Argentina-Brazil bilateral trade, which decelerated in the end of 2008, entered a 
free-fall period in the first months of 2009. In January, Argentine exports dropped 51% against 
the previous year, a contraction not seen since the 2001 crisis, with Mercosur being the worst 
affected destination. Brazil’s industrial activity declined rapidly and the country had its first 
trade deficit in 93 months. 
To mitigate the crisis shock, all three countries have since adopted expansionary fiscal 
measures to sustain domestic growth. In China, the former “prudent fiscal policy and tight 
monetary policy” was replaced by “positive fiscal policy and moderately easy monetary policy” 
with a massive fiscal stimulus package amounting to RMB 4 trillion in 2008 (Luo & Zhang, 
2010). In Argentina, 91.7 billion pesos were disbursed between 2008 and 2010. 74% of this 
amount was allocated to finance large-scale infrastructure plans in 2009 (IILS, 2011). As for 
Brazil, the previous emphasis on international competitiveness and exports was replaced by 
explicit efforts to sustain (and protect) domestic demand. The Productive Development Policy 
launched in 2008, aiming initially at upgrading the industrial pattern of investments, was 
transformed into a set of anti-cyclical measures to finance large national companies’ survival, 
                                                 
3 In 2014, about one third of manufacturing exports were concentrated inside of the bloc. The share could be 
even higher if the manufactured goods are medium and high technology intensive items. 
4 Through constant market share analysis, Hiratuka (2016) concluded that China was responsible for an overall 
34% of market share losses suffered by Mercosur member countries between 2001 and 2014. At country level, 
Brazil was the biggest loser with 62% of its losses attributed to China’s competition, followed by Uruguay 
(41%), Paraguay (22%) and Argentina (20%). 
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such as Petrobás (De Oliveria, 2017). Regarding the trade policy arena, there was a policy U-
turn since the second half of 2008 in China. Previous tightening trade policy was relaxed. 
Export duty rebate rates were raised six times from mid-2008 to mid-2009, and the coverage 
extended to all kinds of key sectors, including textiles, apparels, iron and steel, nonferrous 
metals, petrochemicals, etc. (Gourdon et al., 2016). Contrary to China’s offensive stance to 
promote its exports, Argentina bluntly adopted defensive measures to protect its domestic 
market, while Brazil was initially more reluctant to take protectionist measures under Lula’s 
administration. Therefore, Argentina unilaterally widened policy instruments to ‘“surgically” 
target specific tariff positions, which included automatic and non-automatic licenses, VER 
agreements, criterion values, antidumping duties, and export-import parity agreements (Dalle 
& Lavopa, 2010). 
These anti-crisis measures proved to be effective. By 2010, exports and imports of all three 
countries had completed the U shape recovery from the recession of 2008-2009, GDP growth 
rates respectively reached 10.6%, 10.1%, and 7.5% in China, Argentina, and Brazil. However, 
policy orientation diverged afterwards.  
On the one hand, the global financial crisis was considered as impetus to accelerate the 
structural reform launched before the crisis in China. The policy support to the exports of labor 
and energy intensive products scaled back as early as 2010, eliminating the export duty rebates 
to products such as steel, nonferrous metals, processing materials, silver powder, starch, 
ethanol, pesticides, pharmaceutical and chemical products, plastic products, rubber products, 
and glass products (Gourdon et al., 2016). The fiscal and monetary policy became tightened 
again, lowering the official expectation of GDP growth rate to 7.5% in 2011. While the fifth 
generation of Chinese leaders headed by Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang took office, China’s 12th 
five-year plan (2011-2015) openly declared the ambition to make the Chinese economy more 
domestic demand and innovation dependent, by raising the expenditure on R&D to 2.2% of 
GDP and fostering the growth of new emerging strategic industries5. Consequently, China’s 
trade structure would be expected to continue climbing the value-added ladder, exporting more 
high technology products based on domestic inputs.  
On the other hand, the deterioration of trade terms, the continuation of a credit squeeze and the 
hike of inflation pressure have made the macroeconomic condition more hostile in Argentina 
and Brazil since 2011. The “temporary” trade relief measures became permanent, and the 
global financial crisis enhanced the triad of development composed of “commodities, credit, 
and domestic consumption”. For example, after Cristina Kirchner started her second mandate, 
a stricter version of the non-automatic import license – DJAI – was put in place to “manage” 
the trade, and the tax on exports of Argentina’s main commodity, soybeans, was raised to 
collect more fiscal revenues (Gallo, 2012). The growing protectionist stance is even clearer in 
Brazil. Under the pressure from import-competing sectors, during Dilma Rousseff’s first term 
(2011-2016), there was the “restoration” of full-fledged protectionism in trade and industrial 
policies (Veiga & Rios, 2015). To start, Brazil became more active in defending its internal 
market by trade related policies. In September 2011, Brazil submitted proposals to its Mercosur 
partners to allow a temporary increase in national tariffs above the Mercosur common external 
tariff to defend local producers from extra-regional imports of a specified list of consumer 
goods. It also resorted to measures such as the removal of tariff discounts to compensate for 
                                                 
5 New emerging strategic industries are energy conservation and environmental protection industries, new-
generation IT industry, biological industry, high-end equipment manufacturing industry, new energy industry, 
new material industry and new-energy automobile industry. According to the 12th five-year plan, they are 
expected to account for 8% of GDP by 2015. 
 7 
currency appreciation, and the re-introduction of non-automatic import licensing to calm 
import demand (Doctor, 2012). In addition, Brazil became the “world champion” regarding the 
use of trade remedy measures, with 152 measures recorded from 2011 to 2015 (De Oliveria, 
2017). But more importantly, the return of protectionism under Rousseff was principally 
implemented through industrial policy measures inspired by import substitution. The Brasil 
Maior Plan (2011-2014), which claimed to aggregate value through innovation, was found to 
focus more on defending the internal market and compensating Brazilian firms for the “Custo 
Brasil” (Czarnecka-Gallas, 2013). The legal framework to enhance preference for national 
products and services in government purchases was updated and policy actions were made 
more expedient. Special sectorial regimes were reinforced or revised with the aim of providing 
incentives for those firms willing to foster a local supply industry (Kupfer et al., 2013). In short, 
the intensification of the requirements of local content seems to be the main “novelty” of 
Rousseff’s industrial policy.   
Therefore, during the aftermath of the global financial crisis, the slowdown of China’s 
economic expansion, due to the transformation from the quantitative growth to the qualitative 
development on one side, and the rise of protectionism and the revival of importation 
substitution strategy in Argentina and Brazil on the other, suggest the end of the golden age of 
bilateral trade between China and Mercosur. Moreover, China’s efforts to encourage the 
exports of technology intensive goods, especially the industrial parts and components, might 
cause a conflict of interest with Argentina and Brazil, which intend to internalize and localize 
the industrial activity. In the following part, after the presentation of the methodology adopted, 
this paper will empirically analyze and explain the understanding of China’s impact on 
Mercosur trade integration and industrial competitiveness through the trade channel. 
3. Methodology and Data 
Most researchers have adopted three different approaches to estimate China’s impact on 
exports and imports of other economies. The first is the measure approach using various indices, 
such as “relative market share analysis”, “export structure similarity”, and “revealed 
comparative advantage”; the second is the CGE model which is used in performing 
counterfactual analysis and in forecasting; the third is the regressions specifically based on 
gravity models. All these methods have their merits and limits. The measure approach is the 
most convenient and intuitive for tracing and comparing export performance in a relatively 
short time between partners involving China. Once applied to disaggregated data, this method 
could provide rich information at both the sector and product level. However, only rough 
evidence and certain types of correlations would derive from comparison, and quantitative 
importance cannot be assessed using this approach. On the contrary, CGE models provide 
quantitative outcomes form a general equilibrium perspective, but require strong assumptions 
that do not necessarily hold in the reality. Moreover, the results also vary according to different 
methods for calibrating the models. Finally, regressions are powerful and rigorous in 
establishing the causality between China’s demand and offer and exports and imports of other 
economies. This method works better with a large time series data set, but at the same time, 
also demands more detailed data, which is not always available especially for developing 
countries. As a result, most literature adopting the regression method cannot reveal the 
differential effects of China at the industry or product level, thus eliminating the rich details 
provided by trade data.  
The analysis in this text is based on the standard CMS method, which can identify the major 
causes of market share changes and compare the evolution of national competitiveness at 
different product level of China, Argentina, and Brazil at their partners’ markets. In the 
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meantime, we would also follow the modified CMS approach elaborated by the Brazilian 
economist Jorge Batista (2008) to assess the quantitative gains and losses of Argentina and 
Brazil due to China’s competition at their Mercosur neighbor’s market. 
The standard constant market share (CMS) model developed by Fagerberg and Sollie (1987), 
when adopting our trilateral trade framework between China, Argentina, and Brazil, would be 
written as follows: 
In each country U of three partners under study 
∆𝐾𝐻 = 𝐾𝐻
𝑡+1 − 𝐾𝐻
𝑡 =
∑ [
𝑋𝐻𝑖
𝑡
𝑀𝑈𝑖
𝑡 × (
𝑀𝑈𝑖
𝑡+1
𝑀𝑈
𝑡+1 −
𝑀𝑈𝑖
𝑡
𝑀𝑈
𝑡 )]
𝑧
𝑖=1
(1)
+
∑ [
𝑀𝑈𝑖
𝑡
𝑀𝑈
𝑡 × (
𝑋𝐻𝑖
𝑡+1
𝑀𝑈𝑖
𝑡+1 −
𝑋𝐻𝑖
𝑡
𝑀𝑈𝑖
𝑡 )]
𝑧
𝑖=1
(2)
 
+
∑ [(
𝑀𝑈𝑖
𝑡+1
𝑀𝑈
𝑡+1 −
𝑀𝑈𝑖
𝑡
𝑀𝑈
𝑡 ) × (
𝑋𝐻𝑖
𝑡+1
𝑀𝑈𝑖
𝑡+1 −
𝑋𝐻𝑖
𝑡
𝑀𝑈𝑖
𝑡 )]
𝑧
𝑖=1
(3)
 
where 𝑡 , 𝑡 + 1  are subscripts that refer to the initial and final year of the comparison, 
respectively; 𝑀𝑈  is country U’s total imports; 𝑀𝑈𝑖  is U’s imports of commodity 𝑖 , 𝑖 =
1, 2, 3… 𝑧; 𝑋𝐻 is country H’s total exports to U; 𝑋𝐻𝑖 is country H’s exports of commodity 𝑖 
to U, 𝑖 = 1, 2, 3… 𝑧; and 𝐾𝐻 is the macro market share of country H in U’s imports. 
Using initial years’ weights (Laspeyres indices) throughout the calculations, the above model 
attributes the change in the macro market share of country H in total imports of a given country 
U (China, Argentina and Brazil respectively in this paper) between the time 𝑡 and 𝑡 + 1 to 
the following three effects. 
1. The product composition effect: This effect calculates what the aggregate market share of 
country H on the U’s market would have been if its market shares in individual commodity 
groups had remained constant. In other words, it captures the exogenous effect on the demand 
side. The sign of the “product composition effect” would be positive if country H had 
concentrated its exports in the initial year on the commodities whose markets were growing 
relatively fast, and would be negative if H had been concentrated in slowly growing commodity 
markets. This assumed initial advantage or disadvantage would be moderated by: 
2. The competitiveness effect6: This effect calculates to what extent the macro share gain or 
loss of country H on the U’s market could be attributed to the sum of its gains and losses in 
micro shares on individual commodities. The sign of the competitiveness effect indicates the 
overall gain or loss of export competitiveness of country H against its competitors on the 
market of U’s imports, but by itself it doesn’t necessarily imply the rise or decline of the 
national industrial competitiveness because of relative dynamism of U’s demand of individual 
commodity groups that change over time, which results in: 
3. The relative adaptation effect: This effect indicates to what degree country H has succeeded 
in adapting the commodity composition of its exports to the changes in the commodity 
composition of the U’s market. The sign and value of this effect depends on the correlation 
between the product composition effect and the competitiveness effect. The sign of the 
“relative adaptation effect” would be positive if country H has adapted its export structure 
faster than the average of all countries exporting to country U, by gaining market share in 
                                                 
6 It is different from the “competitiveness effect” with the Paache index, which is weighted by the shares of 
each commodity in the end year. 
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products for which demand was growing faster than average and/or losing market share in 
products for which demand was growing slower than average. In other words, the relative 
adaptation effect measures to what extent country H has adjusted its export structure in the 
final year compared with its position in the initial year to the changing import structure of 
country U between time 𝑡 and 𝑡 + 1. 
The standard CMS model improves on the relative market share (RMS) model by 
distinguishing the competitiveness effect from the product composition effect, however it still 
falls short in telling us to what extent a country’s gain or loss of competitiveness could be 
attributed directly to another country’s loss or gain in competitiveness. Brazilian economist 
Jorge Batista (2008) explored the potentiality of the CMS method, and developed a new version 
of the CMS model that can distribute the gain or loss of one supplier to its competitors. The 
basic idea is that in a zero-sum game, the gain or loss of market share of country H in a specific 
country’s market should be equal to all the losses or gains in market shares of the rest of the 
competitors. Thus, we have: 
∆𝐾𝐻 = ∑(
𝑋𝐽
𝑡
𝑀𝑢
𝑡 −
𝑋𝐽
𝑡+1
𝑀𝑢
𝑡+1)
𝑛
𝐽≠𝐻
 
where 𝑡 , t + 1 are subscripts that refer to the initial and final year of the comparison, 
respectively; subscript J refers to the competitor, 𝐽 = 1, 2, 3…𝑛 ; 𝑀𝑈  is the country U’s 
imports of manufactured goods; 𝑋𝐽 is country 𝐽’𝑠 exports of manufactured goods to U, 𝐽 =
1, 2, 3…𝑛; and ∆𝐾𝐻 is the change in the macro market share of country H in U’s imports. 
The modified CMS identity thus allows us to estimate quantitatively the distribution of the gain 
or loss of market share of a specific country in U’s markets between the time 𝑡 and 𝑡 + 1 to 
its competitors, both at the aggregate level as well as at the disaggregate level by product group. 
Both methods presented above require input of trade data disaggregated at the most detailed 
level, since data aggregated at high level would combine different individual commodities that 
are not replaceable, thus suggesting nonexistent competition. For this end, we would use 
COMTRADE data disaggregated at the HS 6-digit level (1996 version), and choose to extract 
relevant data from CEPII’s BACI database for two reasons. First, BACI recalculates the FOB 
import values, making exporter country’s reported data more consistent with importer 
country’s one. Secondly, the reliability of country reporting is assessed based on the reporting 
distances among partners. These reporting qualities are used as weights in the reconciliation of 
each bilateral trade flow twice reported. It is also worth noting that both analytical tools are 
very sensitive to changes in the base year. Trade shares at a disaggregate level can vary from 
year to year, and the volatility of certain products could be so radical that an inappropriate 
selection of reference years for comparison would generate misleading results. Such potential 
methodological errors could become more pronounced during the post-crisis era, when the 
world trade recovery is still uncertain and the market is overly sensitive to unexpected incidents. 
To mitigate this problem, we substitute single year point data by average shares over a longer 
three-year period. More precisely, we cut the whole 2009-2014 period into two, three-year sub-
periods, and consider average shares over 2009-2011 as reflecting immediate crisis impact on 
trade between Argentina, Brazil, and China, and that over 2012-2014 as representing more 
consolidated and recent situation after post-crisis policies being gradually materialized in 
respective countries. We later refer to the OECD’s ISIC Rev. 3 technology intensity definition 
to regroup manufactured items according to their technology level, and BEC Rev. 4 to 
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distinguish capital, intermediate and consumption goods. To do this, WITS correspondence 
tables would be applied. 
4. China’s Import Effect 
China’s imports from Argentina and Brazil were overwhelmingly tilted toward single 
commodities. Over the whole period between 2009 and 2014, soybeans (HS 120100) on 
average accounted for around 60% of imports from Argentina, while an average 31% of 
China’s imports from Brazil consisted of soybeans, with another 38% attributed to iron ores 
(HS 260111 and 260112). It is therefore not surprising to find that both countries’ market share 
changes over China’s market were largely determined by China’s demand and their respective 
competitiveness in these specific products over time.  
Table 2: Market Share Change of Argentina and Brazil in China’s Merchandise Imports by 
Effect Components, 2009-2014 
 Aggregate Production 
Composition 
Competitiveness  Relative 
Adaptation 
Argentina -0.14 0.03 -0.15 -0.02 
Soybeans -0.10 0.03 -0.12 -0.01 
Brazil -0.06 -0.02 -0.03 -0.00 
Soybeans 0.28 0.09 0.17 0.02 
Iron ores -0.25 -0.12 -0.15 0.02 
Two observations can be drawn from Table 2. First, there was the contrasting dynamism 
between soybeans and iron ores for Brazil, which highlights the ongoing structural 
transformation of the Chinese economy in recent years. China’s demand for soybeans stayed 
robust and produced positive product composition effect, while its demand for iron ores slowed 
down so quickly that it completely offset the gains Brazil benefited from with its soybeans 
exports. Second, even though China’s demand for soybeans also drove imports from Argentina, 
its competitiveness in soybeans exports deteriorated, while Brazil presented a clear competitive 
edge over the years. More precisely, as shown in Table 3, the direct competition between Brazil 
and Argentina in soybean exports to China caused the latter net losses, equivalent to US$ 1.13 
billion over the period studied, which represented 94% of Argentina’s total net losses to Brazil. 
This loss is not only significant in absolute terms, but also eye opening in relative terms, given 
the fact that Argentina gained US$ 123.42 million from Brazil in the same commodity group 
between 2002 and 2008. 
Table 3: Net Gains and Losses of Argentina in China’s Merchandise Imports by Competitors, 
2009–2014 (million US$) 
 Brazil United 
States 
Rest 
Competitors 
Total 
Soybeans -1132.73 -698.32 -110.54 -1941.58 
Other agriculture 
goods* 
-56.06 -63.86 -79.63 -199.55 
Mining & Quarrying -0.20  -3.35 -250.56 -254.10 
Industrial manufacture -18.96 -17.88 -84.40 -121.24 
*Other agriculture goods include Agriculture and Hunting (HS01), Forestry and logging 
(HS02), Fishing (HS05), and agriculture based manufacture (HS 15 and 16).  
This shift of the competitive scenario could be attributed to different policies implemented. In 
Argentina, Kirchner’s government adopted discriminatory export taxes expecting to raise 
government funds for social investment by increasing the government's fiscal revenues from 
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rising world grain prices, and to reduce domestic food prices by encouraging farmers to switch 
to growing staple foods like wheat and corn. Export taxes for soybeans were raised firstly in 
November of 2007 from 27.5% to 35%, and further to 46% in June of 2008, provoking the 
Argentine Farm Crisis, which resulted in the Senate’s rejection of the government’s decision 
in July. However, during the entire 2009-2014 period, the export tax for soybeans stayed at 35% 
against 23% for wheat, and 20% for corn. Consequently, the growth area harvested as well as 
the production of soybeans in Argentina slowed down significantly in the post crisis era. On 
the contrary, in Brazil, Lula’s government implemented liberalization policies regarding 
soybean cultivation, rendering unhampered access to imported fertilizers, pesticides, and seeds, 
under the pressure of the famers’ associations seeking to capture the market opportunity 
rendered by China and to expand the domestic production capabilities (Rothacher, 2016). 
Brazil thus experienced a boom in its soybean sector comparable to that observed in Argentina 
before the crisis. According to FAOStat, the agriculture land used for soybean cultivation in 
Brazil increased by 42.5% from 21.25 million hectares in 2008 to 30.27 million hectares in 
2014, making the total yield of soybeans grow from 59.83 million tons to 85.76 million tons. 
The question thereafter is about the representativeness of our observation in the soybean sector. 
In other words, did China’s increasing demand of agricultural commodities trigger an overall 
convergence of economic structure between Argentina and Brazil, thus reducing Brazil’s 
dependence on imported food items from Argentina? The answer is probably no, as the 
proportion of agriculture in Brazil’s national economy has hardly changed between 2009 and 
2014. The agriculture value added accounted for 5.0% of GDP in 2014, a 0.2 percentage points 
decrease compared with 2009, while the labor engaged in agriculture also decreased during the 
same period. The share of credit outstanding in the agriculture sector stayed consistently at 1.5-
1.6%. Thus, the so-called “sojización” was restricted within the agricultural sector with very 
limited spillover effect on the whole economic structure. The same could be said about 
Argentina. During the 2009-2014 period, the agriculture sector represented around 7-8% of its 
GDP without much variation. The “de-sojización” in Argentina suggests a policy orientation 
not aiming to accelerate industrialization, but to channel resources from soybean cultivation to 
plantation of basic staple foods. If we assume that Argentina and Brazil followed different 
specialization paths in their agriculture sector, it would imply higher trade potential between 
Brazil and Argentina. Indeed, total trade flows of agriculture goods, including agriculture based 
manufactures such as edible oil and meat products, between Argentina and Brazil almost 
doubled in the post-crisis era. More importantly, Argentina maintained and amplified its trade 
surplus with Brazil, led by wheat (HS100190), malt (HS 110710), and wheat flour (HS 110100). 
 12 
Nevertheless, Argentine total net trade balance with Brazil was overall negative, and 
determined by industrial manufactured goods. But, after a continuous enlargement of trade 
deficits in manufactured items between 2003 and 2008, the bilateral trade flows, as Figure 1 
shows, became more volatile in the post-crisis period, including a tendency of deficit reduction 
since 2011. During this process, Brazil’s exports to Argentina hardly changed, while those 
from Argentina to Brazil increased by 12%, from an average US$ 11.1 billion during 2009-
2011 to US$ 12.4 billion during 2012-2014. Certain products, especially motor vehicles for 
transport of goods and persons, turned to be positive and deficits were cut sharply in the 
category of telecommunication equipment, engines, and household equipment, resulting in the 
improvement of the current account of Argentina against Brazil. The total trade deficits were 
cut from the peak of US$ 4.8 billion in 2011 to US$ 327 million in 2014.  
(Source: UN COMTRADE) 
The decrease of a manufacturing trade surplus of Brazil with Argentina seems to justify the 
concern of “primarization”. This concern assumes that investors, lured by China’s demands 
and rising commodity prices, would prioritize the investment in lower value-added extractive 
industry, causing industrial downgrading instead of upgrading. Consequently, the export 
structure would be concentrated in resource intensive goods, which are profitable during a 
commodity boom, but vulnerable to the external shock once the price hike ends. In the 
meantime, the easier rentier income would postpone the painful reform program and risky 
investment in technology intensive sectors, casting negative impact on manufacture 
competitiveness in the long run. As already shown in Table 2, Brazil’s loss of momentum in 
exports of iron ores to China was mainly attributed to its lack of competitiveness. It is 
worthwhile to qualify China’s reduction of demand in relative terms. China’s recorded falling 
imports of iron ores between 2012 and 2014 were measured by values, however the absolute 
imported quantity increased by 25% during the same time, which was higher than that recorded 
between 2009 and 2011. Therefore, the reduction of Brazil’s exports of iron ores to China was 
not mainly caused by the decline of China’s demand, but the loss of competitiveness in front 
of other major iron ore producers, such as Australia and Russia. In other words, Brazil’s former 
Figure 1: Trade Balance of Argentina with Brazil by Product Groups, 2003-2014 (million 
US$) 
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expansion of iron ore exports to China was fed by a high rentier margin, rather than supported 
by productivity gains. Although the iron ore production has scaled back after the boom ended, 
the committed investment in the field takes time to be recouped, which in turn debilitates its 
industrial apparatus. In this sense, the recent narrowing of trade surplus with Argentina might 
reflect the delay of industrial modernization and sophistication in Brazil. However, the 
stagnation of industrial upgrading doesn’t necessarily mean the loss of market share in the third 
market, unless there exist competent competitors that have successfully replaced the position 
occupied by Brazil. To what extent can China, given its industrial capacity and manufacturing 
exports, cause the rise and fall of imports and exports of manufactured goods between 
Argentina and Brazil? This question will be examined and answered in the following section. 
5. China’s Export Effect 
Considering imports of manufactured goods7, Argentina has a smaller market than Brazil, but 
both countries experienced a similar growth rate during the post-crisis period. Total imports of 
manufactured goods of Argentina increased by 21% from an average US$ 49.4 billion between 
2009 and 2011 to US$ 59.6 billion between 2012 and 2014, while those of Brazil also grew by 
21% from US$ 151.4 billion to US$ 192.8 billion. However, bilateral trade between Argentina 
and Brazil was much less dynamic. Argentina’s imports from Brazil merely increased by 0.1% 
from US$ 15.64 billion to US$ 15.66 billion, causing a 5.4 percentage points reduction of 
Brazil’s market share in Argentina. In the meantime, Brazil’s imports from Argentina increased 
by a higher 11%, which was still lower than the overall growth rate of its total imports. In the 
end, Argentina accounted for 6.4% of Brazil’s manufactured imports during 2012-2014, a 
decrease of 0.9 percentage points from 2009-2011. In contrast, China’s exports maintained 
impressive momentum, respectively reaching 39% and 43% of growth in Argentina and Brazil. 
China’s market share in Argentina grew from 15.4% to 17.7%, while that in Brazil grew from 
16.3% to 18.3%.  
5.1. Competitiveness Matters 
The loss of Brazil’s macro market shares in Argentina could be attributed to Argentina’s 
changing import structure especially in high technology products. However, according to Table 
4, the demand factor only partially explains the contrasting performance between Brazil and 
China. It is the competitiveness that drove the rise of China’s market share and the fall of 
Brazil’s. In both cases, the competitiveness effect is determinant. While China maintained the 
competitiveness, which was concentrated in medium-high and high technology items, Brazil 
suffered a significant deterioration in the same category. 
Table 4: Market Share Change of Brazil and China in Argentina’s Manufactured Imports by 
Effect Components, 2009-2014 
 Aggregate Production 
Composition 
Competitiveness Relative 
Adaptation 
Brazil -5.4 -1.31 -4.57 0.49 
Medium-high technology -2.29 -0.17 -2.35 0.23 
High technology -1.46 -0.67 -1.32 0.53 
China 2.34 -0.44 1.86 0.92 
Medium-high technology 1.44 -0.16 0.95 0.65 
High technology 1.09 0.08 0.71 0.30 
                                                 
7 Manufactured goods in this paper don’t include agriculture related manufactures, thus only coving products 
with ISIC codes ranging from 17 to 37. 
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On the other hand, Argentina benefited from Brazil’s evolving import demands, which in turn 
produced positive production composition effect in medium-low and medium-high technology 
sectors. However, as demonstrated in Table 5, this advantage was not sufficient to compensate 
its loss of competitiveness. On the contrary, China successfully offset the initial disadvantage, 
represented by the negative production composition effect, by continuous improvement in its 
competitiveness. Again, it is the competitiveness effect that matters the most. 
Table 5: Market Share Change of Argentina and China in Brazil’s Manufactured Imports by 
Effect Components, 2009-2014 
 Aggregate Production 
Composition 
Competitiveness Relative 
Adaptation 
Argentina -0.91 0.22 -1.07 -0.07 
Medium-low technology -0.46 0.17 -0.50 -0.13 
Medium-high technology -0.35 0.10 -0.53 0.08 
China 2.01 -0.28 1.82 0.47 
Medium-low technology 0.53 -0.05 0.51 0.07 
Medium-high technology 1.10 -0.11 0.86 0.36 
The coincidence of sectoral concentration of competitiveness effects in medium-high and high 
technology intensive products between Brazil and China, as well as those in medium-low and 
medium-high technology intensive products between Argentina and China, might suggest a 
direct grab of market share by China from the hands of Argentina and Brazil in their neighbor’s 
market. Nevertheless, we should not forget that Brazil’s worsened competitiveness in medium-
high and high technology sectors puts itself at a disadvantageous position not only against 
China, which is quickly climbing the industrial value-added ladders, but also against more 
advanced industrialized economies, such as the United States and European countries. In the 
same way, as Argentina’s loss of competitiveness took place basically in medium-low and 
medium-high technology sectors, it would undergo pressures imposed by other middle-income 
economies that specialized in producing medium-low technology items. Moreover, all three 
countries recorded positive relative adaptation effects (except for Argentina in medium-low 
technology sector), which indicate quicker adjustment and possible specialization responding 
to demand changes, that would mitigate the direct competition. 
5.2. Relative Decrease of China’s Influence 
The quantitative estimation of losses to top competitors by Argentina and Brazil, as presented 
in Table 6, shows that China was the biggest source of losses. In the meantime, Argentina did 
lose to other developing economies such as India and Mexico, While Brazil did lose to 
developed countries such as the United State and Germany. Nevertheless, the biggest shift of 
competition scenario during the post-crisis period is the emergence of the United States as the 
winner. According to our calculation8, during the ante-crisis period, Brazil’s gains from the 
United States were estimated to be US$ 402.8 million, while Argentina’s gains from the 
country were equivalent to US$ 322.9 million. The regain of competitiveness of the United 
States means that China’s contribution to total losses of Argentina and Brazil was relatively 
reduced. China’s weight in Brazil’s total losses was cut from 62.8% before the crisis to 28.1% 
after the crisis, and from 49.5% to 29% in the case of Argentina. 
Table 6: Losses of Argentina and Brazil to Top Competitors in Neighbor’s Market, 2009-
2014 
           Argentina           Brazil 
                                                 
8 For comparative purpose, the calculation of gains and losses of Argentina and Brazil by competitors before the 
crisis is conducted through the comparison between averages of two sub-periods, 2003-2005 and 2006-2008. 
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 Value 
(US$ m) 
Distribution 
(%) 
 Value 
(US$ m) 
Distribution 
(%) 
China -568.86 29.0% China -938.35 28.1% 
U.S. -335.57 17.1% U.S. -626.45 18.7% 
India -107.84 5.5% Germany -222.18 6.6% 
Mexico -92.81 4.7% Russia -207.01 6.2% 
Netherlands -79.30 4.0% Netherlands -187.92 5.6% 
Other -778.99 39.7% Other -1159.48 34.7% 
Total -1963.37 100.0% Total -3341.40 100.0% 
It is worth pointing out that due to the shale oil revolution, the gains of the United States from 
both countries were concentrated in refined petroleum products. From Brazil, the United States 
gained US$ 205 million in aviation fuel (HS 271000), followed by US$ 84 million in airplanes 
and aircraft (HS 880240), and US$ 13 million in insecticides (HS 380810); while Argentina 
lost to the United States US$ 289 million in aviation fuel (HS 271000), US$ 75 million in 
propane (HS 271112) and respectively US$ 23 million and US$ 13 million in herbicides (HS 
380830) and insecticides (HS 380810). As China is more specialized in manufacturing 
machinery and electronic goods, China continues to be the most relevant competitor in some 
strategic sectors, which merits further analysis. 
5.3. Intermediate Goods and New Competition 
Table 7 sums up gains and losses with China in individual commodities disaggregated at the 
HS 6-digit level and regrouped by technology intensity and BEC classification. Two 
observations need to be highlighted. In the first place, compared with the estimation of losses 
at the aggregate level presented in Table 6, the losses calculated more precisely at disaggregate 
level were much lower, indicating the exaggeration of the direct competition with China. 
Secondly, the losses to China were not only concentrated by sector, but also principally fed by 
the losses in intermediate goods. The “intermediate-ization” of China’s exports to Argentina 
and Brazil corresponds to the general trend of China’s trade structure transformation. As 
Lemoine and Unal (2017) pointed out, while China’s share in world exports of consumption 
goods remained stable between 2007 and 2014, and that of capital goods jumped from 18 to 
26 percent, China’s exports of intermediate goods, and especially parts and components, have 
made a breakthrough in world markets, and China has been a net exporter of semi-finished 
products since 2006 and of parts and components since 2007. This reflects a dramatic change 
that China is no longer specializing only in assembly, but takes part in the upstream stages of 
international supply chains, given the fact that the capacity to export intermediate goods 
reflects more correctly the national technology level by avoiding the “statistical illusion” 
caused by the concentration of final assembly operations (Gallagher & Porzecanski, 2010). 
Table 7: Gains and Losses of Argentina and Brazil to China by Technology Level and BEC 
Classification, 2009-2014 (US$ million) 
 Capital 
goods 
Intermediate 
goods 
Consumption 
goods 
Other Total 
Argentina      
Low  -1,17 -27,79 -10,84 0,00 -39,80 
Medium-low -2,39 -81,73 -5,96 0,86 -89,21 
Medium-high 59,49 -130,85 -23,94 49,19 -46,10 
High -3,31 -8,11 0,35 0,00 -11,07 
Total 52,63 -248,48 -40,40 50,06 -186,18 
Brazil      
Low  -0.49 -24.85 -19.75 0.00 -45.10 
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Medium-low -1.99 -37.48 -6.00 -1.31 -46.78 
Medium-high -65.62 -142.13 -25.94 -5,20 -238.88 
High -25.60 -140.76 4.54 0.00 -161.82 
Total -93.71 -345.21 -47.16 -6.50 -492.58 
Two areas illustrate and explain how China has consolidated its competitiveness in 
intermediate goods especially in medium-high and high technology sectors. The first area 
affects mostly Brazil’s trade with Argentina in ICT products, where Brazil gained from China 
in Office, accounting, and computing machinery, but lost to China in Radio, TV, and 
communication equipment. As presented in Table 8, Brazil’s gains in Office, accounting, and 
computing machinery were basically due to the shift that happened in capital goods. More 
precisely, Brazil’s loss to China in Digital Processing Units (HS 847130) and Digital 
Automatic Data Processing Machines (HS 847141) during the 2003-2008 period were 
transformed to gains from China during 2009-2014, while its loss in Input or Output Units (HS 
847160) was cut sharply to US$ 12.6 million. The erosion of China’s competitiveness in final 
products was also recorded in consumption goods, such as Reception Apparatus for Television 
(HS 852812) which turned to be one source of gains for Brazil after the crisis. On the other 
hand, Brazil’s losses to China were overwhelmingly concentrated in intermediate goods for 
communication equipment, among which Parts of Telephone Sets, Telephones for Cellular 
Networks or for Other Wireless Networks (HS 851790) covered the losses almost entirely.  
Table 8: Breakdown of Brazil’s Gains and Losses with China in Major High-Tech Products 
in Argentina (US$ million) 
 Office, Accounting and 
Computing Machinery 
Radio, TV and 
Communication Equipment 
 2003-2008 2009-2014 2003-2008 2009-2014 
Capital goods -64.22 
847130: -15.44 
847141: 0.00 
847160: -42.52 
6.39 
847130: 17.45 
847141: 11.98 
847160: -12.64 
-37.64 -28.44 
Intermediate goods -1.00 0.19 -26.93 
851790: -0.59 
-135.45 
851790: -135,04 
Consumption goods -0.01 0.00 -21.98 
852812: -21.14 
4.58 
852812: 4.62 
Three reasons might explain Brazil’s regain of competitiveness against China in the computer 
sector. Firstly, Argentina unilaterally raised the tariff rates of electronic consumer goods 
imported from non-Mercosur countries to as high as 35% since 2013. This temporary raise of 
tariff barriers distorted the competitiveness of exporters in favor of Mercosur states. Second, 
the computer sector, identified as strategic sector for a long time in Brazil, has benefited from 
trade protectionism and “infant industry” incentives for more than two decades. In the whole 
period after the 1999-2001 crisis, Bekerman and Dalmasso (2010) found that desktop machines 
and computer equipment had the strongest value-added growth driven by productivity gains. 
Therefore, computers and storage devices are the only exception among eight sub-sectors in 
the ICT industry, which didn’t witness a growth of trade deficits between 2010 and 2014 
(Zylberberg, 2016). Third, in penetrating the Latin American market, all world leaders in the 
PC market, including China’s Lenovo, have all taken assembly in-house, rendering the local 
producer, such as Brazil’s Positivo, unique advantage in developing customized products and 
solutions to specific market segments that have not been properly addressed by world industry 
leaders (Araújo & De Sousa, 2017). 
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However, it is worth noting that Argentina’s import demands for computer related products 
contracted by 15% between 2009-2011 and 2012-2014, while its imports of communications 
equipment increased by 89% during the same period. Under this context, we may conjecture 
that China’s loss of market share to Brazil in the computer sector was the result of its leaving 
the slower track to consolidate its competitiveness in a more dynamic market segment. More 
importantly, China not only hosts some of the largest mobile phone manufacturers, such as 
Huawei, Xiaomi, and OPPO, but also incubates one of the global platform leaders MediaTEK. 
The company has developed design capabilities to create chipsets for mobile handsets. Its low-
cost chipsets have made it a viable competitor in China as well as other emerging economies 
(Brandt & Thun, 2011). In comparison, despite efforts to localize production, Brazil has relied 
on imports to improve its sparsely populated and antiquated mobile telecommunications 
network. Communications equipment made up more than a quarter of the ICT trade deficit in 
2014 (Zylberberg, 2016). The contrast between the two countries in fostering the development 
of new and innovative sectors might explain how the competition, under Argentina’s special 
trade regime9, has resulted in over US$ 135 million losses to Brazil in a single product line. 
China’s move to tap into the growing market segment through the exports of intermediate 
goods could also be illustrated by the evolution of competition in the second area – the 
automotive industry. As the selling story of Mercosur achievement, the automotive industry is 
perhaps the most integrated sector between Argentina and Brazil. Ever since the 
implementation of Protocol No. 31 in 2002, the bloc laid the foundations for a true automotive 
common market, setting both common rules for the administration of trade with extra-zone 
countries and a quasi-free trade scheme between the members. As for the rules under which 
exchange with the rest of the world would take place, Argentina and Brazil agreed to establish 
a common external tariff of 35% for vehicles, 14% for agricultural machinery, and 2% for auto 
parts not produced within the bloc. On the other hand, for other components produced within 
the bloc, it was agreed that a tariff harmonization scheme would be sanctioned, so that from 
2005 onwards they would be identical in both countries. The creation of a common automotive 
market clearly demonstrates the import substitution strategy implemented in both countries, by 
erecting a high tariff barrier to the entry of assembled vehicles, while rendering relative 
freedom to import necessary auto parts that local supplies are incapable of producing. 
The protective measures generated a creation effect on regional trade, especially when the 
global automotive industry underwent a structural transformation giving more importance to 
the emerging markets since 2009. Between the periods under study, the bilateral trade between 
Argentina and Brazil of automotive products increased by 19% from an average US$ 12.8 
billion to an average US$ 15.2 billion, which was much higher than the grow rate of 5% at the 
aggregate level. More importantly, since 2009, a bilateral trade pattern has emerged that marks 
a division of labor between Argentina and Brazil due to the structural asymmetry of market 
size and policy incentives. While Argentina maintains a trade surplus on assembled vehicles 
with Brazil between 2009 and 2014, Brazil became a net exporter of auto parts (Bil, 2016). For 
Pelicaric (2017), the growth of automotive production in Argentina was accompanied by the 
increase of the imported content, which largely benefited Brazil. In the words of Inés Gárriz 
and Tupac Panigo (2015), Brazil has used the bloc as a “refuge” in the face of falling extra-
zone markets after the international crisis. 
                                                 
9 While Argentina has severely restricted the imports of consumer goods since 2009, there is the continuation of 
special regional trade regime to implement its import substitution industrialization strategy. One such region is 
the Tierra del Fuego Free Trade Zone, where imports of parts and components are free of import duties, and 
goods produced in the Free Trade Zone can be imported duty-free into the rest of the Argentine territory. 
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Nevertheless, the relatively better performance of the Brazilian auto part subsector against 
Argentina doesn’t necessarily mean the overall improvement of its competitiveness outside the 
overprotected regional market. In fact, in 2013, Brazil’s trade balance of auto parts reached a 
new level of deficit. The national auto part industry is still trapped in producing items of lesser 
technological value and importing items of greater value, a long lasting systematic problem to 
which the recent Inovar-Auto program didn’t provide a solution (Palmeri et al., 2014). In the 
meantime, in China, the shift of the development of its auto industry from scale expansion to 
strength growth signifies the acceleration of auto part industry integration and 
internationalization. Percentage of the total output of the parts sector in the total output of the 
auto industry has steadily increased to above 40%. Despite the large number, average small 
size and overall technological backwardness of local auto parts manufacturers, some listed 
Chinese manufacturers posted better net profit margin than international tycoons in recent years, 
which is mainly attributed to their investment in advanced technology in certain market 
segments, cheaper but equally qualified products, and higher production efficiency (Deloitte, 
2011). Nowadays, as a key link in the global production and supply system of autos and parts, 
China not only hosts almost all the world leading auto parts manufacturers, but is also a huge 
exporter of home-made auto tires, glasses and audio products. According to the analysis of 
international trade statistics of around 30 auto parts items by Baba (2016), the international 
competitiveness of China’s general auto parts changed from “weak” in 1992 to “slightly strong” 
in 2013. Certain items, such as auto body parts, have dramatically changed from being “very 
weak” to being “strong”. 
Despite the deep integration of China’s auto part industry in the Asian chain of values 
(Amighini, 2012), the momentum of exports of auto parts from China can also be seen in 
Argentina and Brazil. Table 9 presents clear evidence of how the losses related to China’s 
competition in the automotive industry have been overwhelmingly concentrated in 
intermediate goods between 2009 and 2014 for both Argentina and Brazil, while China’s threat 
in the assembled vehicle sector waded significantly in favor of automobile manufacturers 
located in Argentina and Brazil between 2003-2008 and 2009-2014. 
Table 9: Breakdown of Losses and Gains of Argentina and Brazil with China in Motor, 
Railroad, and Transport Equipment (US$ million) 
 Argentina Brazil 
 2003-2008 2009-2014 2003-2008 2009-2014 
Capital goods 1.27 
870431: -1.25 
81.36 
870431: 86.85 
-0.20 -1.03 
Intermediate goods -11.00 -54.35 -15.56 -43.36 
Consumption goods -0.05 -0.15 -72.57 
871120: -71.90 
871130: -0.18 
3.98 
871120: 1.64 
871130: 2.35 
Other -1.02 
870321: -1.20 
870322: 0.08 
870323: 0.06 
49.19 
870321: 7.53 
870322: 29.20 
870323: 12.44 
-14.62 -5.20 
 
In short, the two cases analyzed above suggest a new frontier of competition, where China’s 
presence could be both a curse and a blessing to the manufacturing future of Argentina and 
Brazil. The outcome, however, depends on the policy adjustment both at regional level as well 
as at the national level. 
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6. Conclusion  
Despite the resilience to short-term crisis impact in China, Argentina, and Brazil, the long-term 
crisis aftermath and different macroeconomic situations determined the destiny of anti-crisis 
measures implemented during the first years of the crisis. The anti-cyclic measures phased out 
quickly giving way to the continuation of the structure reform program launched before the 
crisis in China, while protectionist measures and import substitution policies were strengthened 
in Argentina and Brazil. China’s economic “new normal”, which is expected to include more 
domestic consumption and be more innovation dependent, thus exerts common and 
differentiated influence on Argentina and Brazil. The main takeaways of our empirical trilateral 
trade analysis could be summarized following this delineation.  
Regarding the common impacts, although China’s import demands of consumer goods have 
increased rapidly, it was basically nurtured by the craze among Chinese consumers for luxury 
goods, which largely benefited the developed countries. In 2014, 67% of consumer goods 
imported by China were in the high-end segment, and 80% of the consumption goods were 
imported from developed countries (Lemoine & Unal, 2017). Therefore, China’s current 
consumption driven transformation hardly affected its trade pattern with Argentina and Brazil. 
The bulk of its imports from two countries were composed of primary commodities. In the 
meantime, China’s efforts to reduce the productive overcapacity and limit further growth of 
energy and labor intensive industries in favor of technology intensive sectors have intensified 
its exports of intermediate goods to Argentina and Brazil, especially when they have resorted 
to protectionist measures to restrict the imports of extra-regional consumer goods. As a 
consequence, although the overall losses due to China’s competition in the partner’s market 
have relatively reduced for both Argentina and Brazil, they were concentrated in more 
sophisticated intermediate goods segments. 
Considering the differential influences, there would be no better example than the divergent 
export performance of soybeans in Argentina and Brazil, facing China’s robust demands. The 
competitive scenario changed radically in favor of Brazil during the post-crisis period, when 
the policy adjustment turned away from the “sojización” in Argentina. On the contrary, the 
penetration of Chinese made intermediate goods caused more losses for Brazil than for 
Argentina, given the fact that Brazil is the only country that has a complete upstream-
downstream industry system within Mercosur. 
The variation of China’s impact, be it positive or negative, between Argentina and Brazil, 
highlights two internal problems that have plagued Mercosur integration advances: the 
persistence of structural asymmetry and the lack of policy coordination. Mercosur was not 
formed to respond to the real demands of transnational business people in reducing transaction 
costs of cross-border activities, but a State-led political attempt to find an alternative regional 
industrialization way. This State-led integration process doesn’t necessarily fail, but needs 
supranational regulations that harmonize both the structural and the regulatory asymmetries 
that may exist between countries implementing it. Otherwise, the development of the bloc may 
serve to deepen existing asymmetries and generate tensions that undermine the performance of 
the integration process itself (Bekerman & Dalmasso, 2010). Unfortunately, as Baer and Silva 
(2014) argued, “the deleterious effects of the conflict of national interests have been a recurrent 
and important issue in preferential agreements among Latin American countries in the past, 
and still are in the present”. The problem arises from conflicts between political commitment 
to its own people and the respect to the regional strategic priorities in each member country, as 
well as from the different visions of benefits provided by the union between Brazil and its 
smaller partners (Doctor, 2013). When national interests outweigh the Mercosur union, the 
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already weak institutionalization would be further undermined by the poor implementation of 
agreed regional rules at the national level, such as unilateral protectionist measures recurring 
to non-tariff internal trade barriers (BID 2013) and deviations from the common external tariffs 
(Baer & Silva, 2014). 
The global financial crisis justified the inward-looking industrial policies carried out separately 
in Mercosur member countries. Nevertheless, no matter how innovation-orientated they 
claimed to be, the industrial policies in Argentina and Brazil were path dependent and 
conservative in nature. Rather than supporting new and innovative sectors, the industrial 
policies, such as those implemented in Brazil, were formulated to subsidize traditional and low 
technology sectors (Kasahara & Botelho, 2016). Under this context, a technological 
breakthrough in other countries would exacerbate the international competitiveness of 
Mercosur countries in a radical manner. This is the case for how the shale gas revolution in the 
United States made the country a market grabber in Argentina and Brazil, nullifying their 
efforts made to consolidate the competitiveness in the oil and gas sector. 
Behind the inefficiency of such industrial policies lays the fundamental problem related to 
import substitution strategy in a world where the industrial production is fragmented and 
organized along the global value chain (GVC). The import substitution strategy is not 
necessarily incompatible with a GVC-oriented trade policy. The key is to facilitate market 
access to inputs and intermediate goods into the domestic market and seek preferential access 
for exports into the main foreign markets. However, the version adopted in Mercosur not only 
pursues a vision to develop and maintain full production chains within the bloc, but also uses 
the common regional market to negotiate the reciprocal concession with the EU and the United 
States. The insistence of reciprocity and multilateralism postpones the deep integration into 
globalized international production and commercial flows, while Asian countries, including 
China, benefited from early preferential treatment through bilateral negotiation. Current anti-
globalization protectionism symbolized by Brexit in the European Union and Donald Trump’s 
presidency in the United States might suggest the close of the opportunity window for 
Mercosur to achieve, in the short term, any real advance in inter-bloc negotiation. Under such 
context, a sort of bilateralism under the current institution arrangement could be a viable option 
to give greater flexibility in the search of commercial associations, where each partner would 
advance by relatively independent roads and speeds. In this hypothetical scenario, the judgment 
of China’s impact in general, and the debates around the penetration of Chinese made 
intermediate goods specifically, would be contingent on policies deployed in respective 
Mercosur states and on bilateral agreements on trade, investment, and cooperation. 
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